Lender Marking Rights
Five structural approaches — from daily price marks to borrower-driven valuations. The differences determine who marks, when, at what frequency, and what dispute rights exist.
MTM: Daily Price
Calculation Agent marks in its sole discretion — referencing Markit/LoanX/TRACE for traded assets, but applying its own determination for originated private credit loans with no secondary market quote. Margin calls trigger on price decline alone — no credit event required. A broad secondary market sell-off can generate a Borrowing Base Deficiency on a portfolio of performing loans. Dispute via a pre-approved 3rd-party val shortlist; no synthetic bid.
MTC: Breach → Agent Re-mark, Auto-reset on Cure
MTC on discrete credit triggers (leverage, ICR, payment default, MAC). Agent assigns a revised value upon breach. Assets enter on eligibility criteria — no per-asset approval. Upward re-marking is event-driven: when cure financials arrive, the asset automatically resets to par-OID — no borrower request, no quarterly gate. Dispute via 3rd-party val firm or firm cash bid (≥$5M); no synthetic bid.
MTC: Breach → Agent Re-mark, Borrower-Initiated Reset
Marks fire on discrete credit events (leverage breach, ICR breach, payment default) — not price movements. Agent assigns a revised value on breach. Recovery requires borrower initiative: upward re-marking is not automatic on cure — the borrower must request a quarterly reset and the agent must confirm. Assets enter on eligibility criteria; no per-asset friction. Dispute via 3rd-party val firm panel; no synthetic bid. Morgan Stanley runs a bifurcated variant: liquid assets follow daily MTM while private credit follows the Revaluation Event model.
MTC: Breach → Ongoing Lender Discretion + Synthetic Bid
MTC on discrete breach events. Post-breach, the Calculation Agent retains ongoing discretionary re-marking authority — not just a one-time reset. Per-asset approval required at entry. Upward re-marking is borrower-requested quarterly. Critically: dispute resolution uniquely permits a synthetic bid through maturity (CDS, TRS, or equivalent) — the lender can hedge the exposure rather than forcing a sale. The lender doesn't control assets in the vehicle, but the synthetic clause gives them actual derisking authority on a per-position basis.
Insurance Capital Platform
Insurance-capital-funded lenders with a structurally distinct valuation model. BXCI: borrower (HPS) marks on an ongoing basis — BXCI only intervenes on discrete Revaluation Events with per-loan bespoke triggers set at entry. ARs: 67.5% senior / 35% 2L. SOFR+2.95%. No Basel capital constraints; insurance float funding. Barings: bespoke bilateral, not publicly filed.
Key Findings
Terms Ebb & Flow With the Market
The amendment record through 2024 reflects the peak of borrower-friendliness in back-leverage. Conditions have since turned.
JPMorgan Has the First-Mover Clock
The most consequential difference between Approach I and Approaches III/IV isn’t the mark itself — it’s when the clock starts.
Scale Is the Real Variable
Terms are a spectrum. Same borrower, different banks — different terms. Same bank, different borrowers — still different terms. The most extreme example: the least borrower-friendly lender in this dataset becomes the most, for the right borrower.
Per-Asset Consent vs. Eligibility Boxes
Whether a lender approves assets individually or via eligibility criteria reflects a deliberate philosophy — not just operational style.
- Lender vets every inclusion individually — JPMorgan via a pre-approved portfolio list; Goldman and Barclays via affirmative per-asset consent
- Avoids adverse selection — manager can’t cherry-pick or shuffle collateral
- Lender gains informal leverage in a tightening cycle: can slow-walk new approvals without amending the facility
- More friction for the manager; more control for the lender
- Structure defined at close: any asset meeting the criteria is in automatically
- No per-inclusion friction — operationally clean for the manager
- Lender cedes real-time control over collateral composition to the eligibility parameters
- Less leverage over new inclusions post-close
MTC Isn’t One Size Fits All
All MTC facilities look similar on the surface. The second-order details — when a trigger fires, whether it resets automatically, how re-marks compound — determine the real risk profile.
Then there’s the reset question. BNP’s auto-reset on cure means a mark-down reverses automatically when financials recover — no borrower action needed, no quarterly gate. Most other MTC lenders require a borrower request to re-mark upward. That quarterly gate is effectively a one-way ratchet in a volatile credit environment: marks go down immediately on breach, but recovering them requires active borrower management every 90 days.
A Firm Bid Without Synthetic Backstop Is Kabuki Theater
Some lenders require a firm bid to validate a mark dispute. Barclays and Goldman go one layer further
The synthetic clause resolves this. Where it exists — Barclays and Goldman only in this dataset — the lender has the contractual option to go synthetically long on a disputed position via CDS, TRS, or equivalent risk transfer through maturity. The question is no longer “can you find a bid?” but “can you find a counterparty willing to take the other side of a synthetic long at this level?” That is a genuinely harder bar — and if no one will, the disputed mark speaks for itself.
Key Terms Across Lenders
| Key Term | Goldman | JPMorgan | Wells Fargo | Deutsche Bank | Citi | Morgan Stanley | BofA | PNC | BNP | SocGen | Natixis | SMBC | BXCI | Citizens | CIBC | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US PC back-lev. exposure | $105B+ | $50.0B | $36.2B | $30.0B+ | $25.0B+ | $22.0B | $20.1B | $20.0B | $7.0B | ~$1.2B+ | ~$1.3B+ | ~$0.3B+ | ~$1.7B+ | ~$0.8B+ | $4.1B | ~$0.55B+ |
| Lender Marking Rights | IV | I | III | IV | IV | III | III-bifur. | III | II (hybrid) | II | III | III | III | V | III | III |
| Asset approval | Per-asset | Pre-approved list | Eligibility | Eligibility | Per-asset | Eligibility | Eligibility | Eligibility | Eligibility | Eligibility | Eligibility | Eligibility | Eligibility | Bespoke | Eligibility | Eligibility |
| Initial valuation | ~Orig. AV | Markit/LoanX or cost | ~Orig. AV | ~Orig. AV | Borrower mark | ~Orig. AV | BSL: Markit bid; PC: par-OID | ~Orig. AV | Par less OID | Par less OID | ~Orig. AV | ~Orig. AV | ~Orig. AV | Borrower marks | ~Orig. AV | ~Orig. AV |
| Ongoing valuation | ~Revaluation Event MTC | Daily MTM (CA) | ~Revaluation Event MTC | ~Revaluation Event MTC | Agent discretion post-VAE | ~Revaluation Event MTC | BSL: daily MTM; PC: quarterly model | ~Revaluation Event MTC | Sub-line hybrid | MTC auto-reset on cure | ~Revaluation Event MTC | ~Revaluation Event MTC | ~Revaluation Event MTC | Borrower marks; BXCI Reval. Events | ~Revaluation Event MTC | ~Revaluation Event MTC |
| MTC / MTM triggers | ~NSL+ICR dbl | Price decline alone | ~NSL+ICR dbl | ~NSL+ICR dbl | ~NSL+ICR dbl | NSL+ICR dbl | BSL: price; PC: NSL+ICR | ~NSL+ICR dbl | BB + capital coverage | Revaluation Event auto | ~NSL+ICR dbl | ~NSL+ICR dbl | ~NSL+ICR dbl | Bespoke per-loan | ~NSL+ICR dbl | ~NSL+ICR dbl |
| Synthetic bid | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | ND | No | No |
| Cash bid minimum | ND | N/A | ND | ND | ND | ND | ND | ND | ND | ≥$5M | ND | ND | ND | ND | ND | ND |
| Failed dispute lockout | 90 days | 1 quarter | ~90 days | ~90 days | ~90 days | ~90 days | 6 months | ~90 days | ND | ~90 days | ~90 days | ~90 days | ~90 days | ND | ~90 days | ~90 days |
| Max advance rate (1L PC) | ~65% | 57–60% | 67.5–71.25% | ND | ~60–65% | 65–72.5% | ~60–70% | ~65–72.5% | ND | ~65% | ~60–62.5% | ~62.5% | ND | 67.5% | ND | ND |
| Cure period | 3+5 days | 3 days | 5 days | ~5 days | 3 days | 5 days | 5+30 days | ~5 days | ND | 5 days | ~5 days | ~5 days | ~5 days | ND | ~5 days | ~5 days |
| Borrower friendliness | ★★☆☆☆ | ★☆☆☆☆ | ★★★☆☆ | ★★★☆☆ | ★★☆☆☆ | ★★★☆☆ | ★★★★☆ | ★★★☆☆ | N/A | ★★★★★ | ★★★☆☆ | ★★★☆☆ | ★★★☆☆ | ★★★★☆ | ★★★☆☆ | ★★★☆☆ |
Sourced from unredacted EDGAR exhibits. Size figures from Q1 2026 earnings calls and annual reports. Barings/MM omitted — bespoke bilateral docs not publicly filed. ★ = borrower-friendliness rating (scored on valuation trigger, re-mark mechanic, dispute rights, asset approval model, cure period). † Goldman proxy includes prime brokerage; figure is overstated for pure fund finance.
Analyzed Agreements
44 primary sources — unredacted EDGAR exhibits, earnings disclosures, and investor presentations. Each underlies at least one data point in this dataset.
| Ref | Agreement / Document | Manager / BDC | Year | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPM-1 | Locust Street Funding A&R LSA | FSK / FS KKR | 2019 | sec.gov ↗ |
| JPM-2 | Carlyle Credit Solutions SPV 4th A&R | Carlyle / CGBD | 2024 | sec.gov ↗ |
| JPM-3 | OSCF Lending SPV LLC | Oaktree Strategic Credit | 2023 | sec.gov ↗ |
| JPM-4 | GS PMMC II SPV — 2nd A&R (NAV structure) | Goldman Sachs PMMC II | 2024 | sec.gov ↗ |
| JPM-5 | BCPC II-J LLC | Bain Capital Private Credit | 2024 | sec.gov ↗ |
| GS-1 | ORCC II Financing LLC 2nd A&R Credit Agreement | Blue Owl / OBDC | 2019 | sec.gov ↗ |
| GS-4 | BCPC I, LLC — Credit Agreement (Goldman Sachs, Nov 2023) | Bain Capital Private Credit | 2023 | sec.gov ↗ |
| GS-2 | Grouse Funding LLC Credit Agreement | Apollo Debt Solutions BDC | 2022 | sec.gov ↗ |
| GS-3 | Society Hill Funding LLC — Master Repurchase Agreement (repo, pre-LSA) | FS Investment Corp III | 2015 | sec.gov ↗ |
| WF-1 | ARCC CP Funding LLC A&R LSA — Amendment 13 | Ares Capital (ARCC) | 2020 | sec.gov ↗ |
| WF-2 | HLEND Holdings E, L.P. Credit Agreement | HPS Corporate Lending | 2024 | sec.gov ↗ |
| WF-3 | PIF Financing SPV LLC Credit Agreement | North Haven / Morgan Stanley AM | 2022 | sec.gov ↗ |
| DB-1 | OCSI Senior Funding II A&R LSA | Oaktree / OCSI | 2020 | sec.gov ↗ |
| DB-2 | GBDC 3 Funding LLC Credit Agreement | Golub Capital BDC 3 | 2022 | sec.gov ↗ |
| DB-3 | OSCF Lending IV SPV | Oaktree Strategic Credit | 2023 | sec.gov ↗ |
| BAR-1 | FSSL Finance BB AssetCo Margining Agreement | FS KKR / FS Energy & Power | 2023 | sec.gov ↗ |
| BAR-2 | T Series Financing SPV Credit Facility | T Series / Morgan Stanley IF | 2023 | sec.gov ↗ |
| BAR-3 | T Series Financing SPV A&R 2025 | T Series / Morgan Stanley IF | 2025 | sec.gov ↗ |
| C-1 | OSI 2 Senior Lending / OCSL LSA | Oaktree / OCSL | 2019 | sec.gov ↗ |
| C-2 | OCSL Senior Funding II 6th Amendment | Oaktree / OCSL | 2021 | sec.gov ↗ |
| C-3 | Cardinal Funding LLC Credit Agreement | Apollo Debt Solutions BDC | 2022 | sec.gov ↗ |
| MS-1 | HLEND Holdings A, LLC LSA | HPS Corporate Lending | 2022 | sec.gov ↗ |
| MS-2 | BCRED Maroon Peak Funding | Blackstone Private Credit (BCRED) | 2021 | sec.gov ↗ |
| MS-4 | Twin Brook Capital Funding XXXIII MSPV — LSA (2022, Angelo Gordon/Twin Brook) | Twin Brook / AGTB | 2022 | sec.gov ↗ |
| MS-3 | OSCF Lending II SPV | Oaktree Strategic Credit | 2022 | sec.gov ↗ |
| BA-1 | HLEND Holdings B, L.P. Credit Agreement | HPS Corporate Lending | 2022 | sec.gov ↗ |
| BA-2 | Barings BDC Funding Credit Agreement (LIBOR-era) | Barings / BBDC | 2018 | sec.gov ↗ |
| PNC-1 | GDLC Funding LLC / Revolving Credit & Security Agreement | Golub Capital DLC | 2022 | sec.gov ↗ |
| CIT-1 | PIF Financing II SPV LLC Credit Agreement | North Haven Private Income Fund | 2023 | sec.gov ↗ |
| BNP-1 | ARCC FB Funding LLC / Credit Agreement | Ares Capital (ARCC) | 2020 | sec.gov ↗ |
| BNP-2 | ARCC FB Funding 9th Amendment | Ares Capital (ARCC) | 2025 | sec.gov ↗ |
| BNP-3 | DLF Financing SPV / Credit Agreement | MS Direct Lending Fund | 2020 | sec.gov ↗ |
| BNP-4 | HLEND Holdings D Credit Agreement | HPS Corporate Lending | 2023 | sec.gov ↗ |
| SG-1 | ORCC III Financing LLC LSA — Amendment 7 | Blue Owl (OBDC) | 2025 | sec.gov ↗ |
| NAT-1 | ORCC Financing II LLC Credit Agreement — Amendment 9 | Blue Owl (OBDC) | 2024 | sec.gov ↗ |
| SMBC-1 | CCT Tokyo Funding LLC LSA — 7th Amendment | FS KKR / CCT | 2021 | sec.gov ↗ |
| SMBC-2 | CCT Tokyo Funding LLC LSA — Original | FS KKR / CCT | 2015 | sec.gov ↗ |
| SMBC-3 | OSCF Lending III SPV | Oaktree Strategic Credit | 2023 | sec.gov ↗ |
| SMBC-4 | ARCC JB Funding LLC | Ares Capital (ARCC) | 2023 | sec.gov ↗ |
| ALLY-1 | Ambler Funding LLC Credit Agreement | FS KKR Capital Corp | 2023 | sec.gov ↗ |
| CIBC-1 | Callowhill Funding LLC Credit Agreement | FS KKR Capital Corp | 2021 | sec.gov ↗ |
| BX-1 | HLEND Holdings C Credit Agreement (insurance capital) | HPS Corporate Lending / BXCI | 2022 | sec.gov ↗ |
| SIZE-1 | Banks Tally $185B+ of Back-Leverage to Private Credit — Bloomberg Apr 2026 | Various (Q1 2026 earnings) | 2026 | bloomberg.com ↗ |
| SIZE-2 | Deutsche Bank Annual Report 2025 — €25.9B fund finance disclosed | Deutsche Bank | 2025 | www.db.com ↗ |
| SIZE-3 | Barclays Investor Day 2025 — ~£20bn UK+US back-leverage | Barclays | 2025 | home.barclays ↗ |
| BAR-4 | MassMutual DPI & Asset Finance → Barings transition | Barings / MassMutual | 2015 | barings.com ↗ |
JPMorgan
- Non-recourse to Goldman Sachs PMMC II LLC — confirmed in 8-K
- Zero daily price marks — no per-asset MTM whatsoever
- Single portfolio NAV ratio (60%) as the sole trigger — no obligor-level metrics
- Trigger at 67.5% NAV → JPM consent on asset sales; Cure at 60% → JPM directs sales
Goldman Sachs
firm bid "in synthetic form" permitting risk transfer through maturity. Goldman's language is structurally identical to Barclays'. Grouse Funding (Apollo, 2022) contains the same language. Failed dispute: 90-day lockout.Wells Fargo
Deutsche Bank
Barclays
"a firm bid either in cash or in synthetic form in respect of a risk transfer through the maturity date of such Asset." Option (c) — the synthetic bid — permits risk transfer via CDS, TRS, or equivalent rather than forcing a cash sale. Absent from every other template in this dataset. Failed dispute: ~90-day lockout.